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Abstract 
A probability distribution is regular if no possible event is assigned probability zero.  While 
some hold that probabilities should always be regular, three counter-arguments have been 
posed based on examples where, if regularity holds, then perfectly similar events must have 
different probabilities.  Howson (2017) and Benci et al. (2016) have raised technical objections 
to these symmetry arguments, but we see here that their objections fail.  Howson says that 
Williamsonǯs (2007) ǲisomorphicǳ events are not in fact isomorphic, but Howson is speaking of 
set-theoretic representations of events in a probability model.  While those sets are not 
isomorphic, Williamsonǯs physical events are, in the relevant sense.  Benci et al. claim that all 
three arguments rest on a conflation of different models, but they do not.  They are founded on 
the premise that similar events should have the same probability in the same model, or in one 
case, on the assumption that a single rotation-invariant distribution is possible.  Having failed to 
refute the symmetry arguments on such technical grounds, one could deny their implicit 
premises, which is a heavy cost, or adopt varying degrees of instrumentalism or pluralism about 
regularity, but that would not serve the project of accurately modelling chances.  
 
 
  
 2 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Many philosophers have suggested that probabilities (rational credences, objective 
chances, or both) should be regular (Carnap 1950, 1963; Kemeny 1955, 1963; Shimony 1955; 
Jeffreys 1961; Edwards, Lindman, and Savage 1963; De Finetti 1964; Stalnaker 1970; Lewis 
1980, 1983; Skyrms 1980; Appiah 1985; Jackson 1987; Jeffrey 1992; Wenmackers and Horsten 
2010; Benci et al. 2013; 2016; Hofweber 2014).1  A probability measure is regular if it assigns 
probability zero only to impossible events, so that every strictly possible event gets positive 
probability.  For a probability space Ω, F, P  this is represented by the condition that if P(A) = 0 , 
then A is the empty set.  
Such a probability measure can be difficult to arrange, especially where the set of possible 
outcomes is infinite and all outcomes are equally likely, for then the regular, non-zero 
probabilities of these outcomes will normally add up to more than one.  But we can avoid this 
problem if we allow P to take infinitesimal values.  If we assign a non-zero infinitesimal 
probability to each outcome in our sample space, these need not add up to more than one.2  The 
desideratum of regularity has been the main reason for introducing infinitesimal and hyperreal3 
probabilities.  
                                                     
1 I do not claim that all of these authors are supporters of regularity, only that the particular works cited 
at least make suggestions in that direction. 
2 For uncountable sample spaces, regularity and finite additivity already require infinitesimals, even if the 
probabilities are not uniform.  It is easy to show that, for any function P: Ω  R+ where Ω is uncountable 
and R+ is the set of positive real numbers, there are finitely many ω0, ω1,…, ωn  Ω such that P(ω0) + P(ω1) +…+ P(ωn) > 1. 
3 Hyperreal numbers are the elements of a field generated by real numbers and infinitesimals. 
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Some think that this desire for regularity is a naïve mistake, but the arguments for it are 
serious enough to warrant response.  (See above references.  Benci et al. 2016 reviews some of 
the main arguments.)  Williamson (2007), Parker (2012), Benci et al. (2016), and others 
(Bernstein and Wattenberg 1969, Barrett 2010, Pruss 2013) have proposed arguments against 
regularity based on the fact that, if regularity holds, certain perfectly similar events cannot have 
the same probability.  Howson (2017) and Benci et al. (2016) have recently tried to refute those 
arguments.  Here we will see how their refutations go wrong.4  (Thus we will buttress the case 
against a general requirement of regularity.)   
We will review the three symmetry arguments that Howson and Benci et al. criticize, 
fleshing them out in certain respects.  We will then consider and rebut Howson and Benci et al.ǯs 
objections.  Both Howson and Benci et al. focus on the details of formal probability models, 
claiming that, once Williamsonǯs models are made explicit, his error becomes apparent.  Benci et 
al. claim that this extends as well to Parkerǯs argument and their own proposal.  But we will see 
that the technical errors alleged by Howson and Benci et al. are not present in the original 
symmetry arguments.5  Those arguments are based on very general principles, which we will 
make more explicit here, and which, while they are not above doubt, are not beholden to the 
technical details of any particular probability model.  Finally, we will consider what stances a 
regularist might take given that the objections fail.   
                                                     
4 Easwaran (2014) defends Williamson against a different kind of objection, which we will not review 
here.  He also argues that the expressiveness promised by regular probabilities is already provided by the 
non-numerical aspects of probability models, e.g., by inclusion relations between sets of outcomes. 
5 As we will see, Benci et al. in a sense misunderstand their own proposed argument against regularity, for they present it as a parallel to Williamsonǯs, and in misconstruing Williamsonǯs argument, they 
likewise misdiagnose their own. 
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2.  The symmetry arguments 
2.1 Williamson’s coin flip argument 
Consider a fair coin that is tossed infinitely many times, at times t0 + n seconds for n = 0, 1, ʹ,….  Let H(1...) = HȋͳȌ & HȋʹȌ & Hȋ͵Ȍ &… be the event that every toss comes up heads.  
Williamson argues that, even if we let probabilities take hyperreal values, Prob(H(1…)) = 0.6  Since Hȋͳ…Ȍ is strictly possible, regularity fails.  The crucial step in Williamsonǯs argument is the claim that, if Hȋʹ…Ȍ = HȋʹȌ & Hȋ͵Ȍ &… is the event that every toss after t0 comes up heads, then Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ are ǲisomorphic eventsǳ and therefore should have the same probability. 
Let H(1) be the event that the first toss comes up heads.  Then 
 Prob(H(1...)) = Prob(H(1) & H(2...)). 
Since the coin is fair and the tosses independent, we have, 
Prob(H(1)) = ½,  
Prob(H(1) & H(2...)) = Prob(H(1))  Prob(H(2...)), 
and therefore, 
Prob(H(1...)) = (½) Prob(H(2...)). 
But since Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ are isomorphic, Williamson claims,   
Prob(H(1...)) = Prob(H(2...)),  
and by substitution, 
 Prob(H(1...)) = (½) Prob(H(1...)). 
Since zero is the only solution to x = (½)x,  
                                                     
6 Throughout we use ǮProbǯ for functions over physical events and ǮPǯ for functions over sets that model 
physical events. 
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 Prob(H(1...)) = 0. 
Thus, the possible event Hȋͳ…Ȍ has probability zero, so regularity fails.7   
If this argument is sound, it applies equally whether the values of Prob are real or 
hyperreal, since both number systems have the same first-order properties (those of a real 
closed field), including all the properties used in the argument. 
 
2.2 Physical isomorphism  
Before we review the other arguments, let us flesh out Williamsonǯs a little.  It clearly 
relies on the following assumption:   
Isomorphism Principle (IP):  If two events are isomorphic (in the relevant sense), 
they should have the same probability. 
 
Williamson does not state IP explicitly, but what he says is suggestive: 
But H(1...) and H(2...) are isomorphic events.  More precisely, we can map the 
constituent single-toss events of H(1...) one-one onto the constituent single-toss events 
of H(2...) in a natural way that preserves the physical structure of the set-up just by 
mapping each toss to its successor.  H(1...) and H(2...) are events of exactly the same 
qualitative type; they differ only in the inconsequential respect that H(2...) starts one 
second after H(1...).  Thus H(1...) and H(2...) should have the same probability. 
 
Hence, the fact that Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ have the same qualitative physical properties is, for 
Williamson, the reason that they should have the same probability, and presumably this 
inference is undergirded by a general principle like IP.  
Why should one accept IP?  An argument for a version of IP might run as follows:   
(I) The laws of physics are space-time invariant. 
 
(II) The chance of an event is determined by the physical laws and local     
qualitative circumstances. 
                                                     
7 Williamson introduces a third sequence of coin tosses in order to make his point more vivid, but we 
need not consider it here. 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Therefore,  
(IP')   Two events that differ at most in where and when they hypothetically occur 
(and perhaps in matters of bare identity but not in qualitative features) have 
the same chance. 
 
What I mean by (I) is just that the laws of physics are the same in every place at every time, and 
they do not have any place- or time-dependent features.  Whatever the laws imply about the 
outcome of an experiment is the same no matter where and when that experiment is conducted, 
other things being equal.8  This in itself does not imply IP', because we might think that chances 
depend on something other than laws and qualitative circumstances.  But if (II) holds as well, 
then IP' follows (barring any creative concept stretching).  
The above argument applies directly only to physical chances or propensities.  But 
according to the Principal Principle (Lewis 1980, 1994), our credences should generally track 
known chances, so we should also assign equal credence to such isomorphic events.  
Thus, the regularist is in an awkward dilemma:  She must either deny the standard and 
sensible principle that physical laws are space-time invariant, or deny that chances are 
determined by local circumstances and laws.  Neither is inconceivable, but either is a weighty 
consequence, perhaps too weighty for the a priori arguments for regularity to sustain. 
One might take the view that this argument from space-time invariance is irrelevant, since 
the stipulation that the individual tosses are independent and identically distributed (iid) already implies that Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ have the same ǲstandardǳ probability.9  Under the 
Kolmogorov axioms (including countable additivity), ProbȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ = ProbȋHȋʹ…ȌȌ = Πn  N ½ = 0 
(where N = {0, 1, 2,…}).  However, to appeal to that result would be begging the question, for it 
                                                     
8 Notice that (I) is weaker than Galilean or Lorentzian invariance, according to which the laws of physics 
are the same across all inertial reference frames (in a Euclidean or Minkowskian space-time, 
respectively).  Premise (I) is just the claim that, given one such reference frame, the laws of physics are 
the same and apply in the same way in each part of that one reference frame. 
9 This was argued by an anonymous reviewer. 
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assumes the standard axioms and number system, which regularists propose to revise.  As 
Williamsonǯs argument shows, the equality ProbȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ = ProbȋHȋʹ…ȌȌ fails under any 
alternative theory in which ProbȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ and ProbȋHȋʹ…ȌȌ are not strictly zero, since ProbȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ = ½ ProbȋHȋʹ…ȌȌ.  If one wishes to argue directly from iid to the equality of ProbȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ and ProbȋHȋʹ…Ȍ), one must assume either countable additivity, which regularists 
reject, or some other probability axiom that regularists would likely reject, e.g., that the 
probability of a conjunction of independent events is entirely determined by the probabilities of 
the conjuncts.  (This is close to what Hofweber (2014) calls conjunctive local determination and 
does reject.)  Such a strategy fails because it assumes too much, and since it fails, the appeal to 
space-time invariance is relevant, if it succeeds.  In any case, Williamson does not argue directly 
from iid to ProbȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ = ProbȋHȋʹ…ȌȌ, but appeals instead to the qualitative physical 
properties of the events. 
 
2.3 The circle argument 
Williamsonǯs Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ are conjunctions of infinitely many coin flip outcomes, in 
the sense that they require infinitely many toss outcomes all to occur.  (I do not wish to conflate the physical events Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ with conjunctive sentences.)  Another argument against 
regularity (Bernstein and Wattenberg 1969, Barrett 2010, Parker 2012, Pruss 2013) involves 
disjunctive rather than conjunctive events.   
Construct a set of points on the unit circle as follows:  Let p0 = (1, 0) in polar coordinates, 
i.e., the point on the circle due-right of the centre.  Let pn + 1 be the point (1, n + 1) on the circle, 
one radian counter-clockwise from pn.  Then let C0 = {p0, p1, p2,…} = {ȋͳ, n): n  N}, and let C1 = 
{p1, p2, p3,…} = {ȋͳ, n + 1): n  N}.  Notice that C1 is a rotation of C0 by one radian, but is also a 
proper subset of C0, since C1 does not contain p0. 
Now, let us choose a point on the circle randomly, say by throwing a dart at the interior 
disk and constructing a radius through the centre of the dart shaft to a point on the circle.  What 
is the probability that this point lies in C0, and what is the probability that it lies in C1?  We can 
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model this experiment with a probability space S1, F, P , where S1 is the unit circle and F an  
algebra on subsets of the circle that at least include C0, C1, and the singleton {p0}.  The event EC 
that the point chosen by our experiment lies in a given set C is modelled by that very set, i.e., 
Prob(EC) = P(C), where Prob is the chance or credence of a physical occurrence and P is a 
function on sets that models Prob.  Thus, in our model, the set C0 represents the disjunctive 
event that the point chosen by the dart throw is p0 or p1 or p2 or… .   
Now, assume10 that P is rotationally symmetric.  Then P(C0) = P(C1).  But by finite 
additivity, P(C0) = P({p0}) + P(C1).  Hence, P({p0}) = 0, contradicting regularity.  And as with 
Williamsonǯs argument, this holds whether P takes hyperreal values or only real values. 
There are significant differences between this argument and Williamsonǯs.  Firstly, the 
circle experiment takes place in a finite region of space-time.  It is just a single dart throw at a 
finitely bounded disc (or in other versions, a single spin of a spinner or a single quantum 
vacuum fluctuation).  Thus it avoids Williamsonǯs unrealistic hypothesis of an eternal sequence 
of tosses, in perfect rhythm, of a single, ever unchanging coin.  And if one is tempted to dodge 
Williamsonǯs argument by suggesting that space-time invariance only applies to finite 
experiments and not to temporally infinite sequences of events, such a dodge will not escape the 
circle argument. 
Secondly, the circle argument does not rely on IP.11  It simply assumes that the 
distribution is rotationally symmetric.  However, this is only plausible if a dart throw or some 
                                                     
10 I do not claim that P must be rotationally symmetric.  That would perhaps be question begging, but in 
any case mistaken.  Real dart throws are presumably not perfectly rotationally symmetric.  I merely claim 
that it is plausible that a rotationally symmetric distribution is possible.  Committed regularists would 
have us believe that a possible event must always have positive probability.  This argument shows that 
such a claim has a rather strong consequence, namely that fully rotationally symmetric continuous 
distributions are impossible.   
11 Thus, not all of the symmetry arguments depend on space-time invariance, nor on the assumption that 
chances are determined by laws and local circumstances. 
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other experiment really can be performed with a perfectly symmetric distribution.12  Intuitively 
this ought to be possible, but to my knowledge there is no standard physical principle to 
guarantee it in the way that space-time invariance (along with (II)) guarantees Williamsonǯs 
result.  It does not help much to appeal to empirically confirmed laws that imply symmetry, for a 
committed regularist will claim that our empirical laws need a slight revision, so that any 
probabilities that they imply are adjusted by infinitesimal amounts to make them regular.  Such 
subtle revisions are generally compatible with observed frequencies.  If we could construct an 
example where the symmetry is due to some general principle rather than specific laws, the 
regularists would not have such an easy retort.  Parker 2012 attempts to construct such an 
example involving quantum vacuum fluctuations, but the success of that example is debatable.13  
So an uncontroversially realistic and principled example is yet to be given but is far from being 
ruled out.14  Furthermore, Benci et al. hold that a probability theory ought to be able to describe 
                                                     
12 In the circle argument stated here, we require rotational symmetry, but as shown in Parker 2012, there 
are transformations of the circle example where translation or reflection symmetry is sufficient. 
13 The example relies on the familiar picture of quantum vacuum fluctuations, in which virtual particles 
appear and annihilate each other independently of observations.  Some have argued in another context 
that this picture is naïve (Boddy, Carroll, and Pollack 2016, 2017).  
14 An anonymous reviewer suggests that none of our examples is physically realistic in any world whose 
laws are even remotely like our worldǯs, and questions whether we can trust our intuitions about such 
examples.  I am not certain that the examples are so unrealistic.  The dart throw and the related vacuum 
fluctuation of Parker 2012 only require that exact real values are selected from a continuum in a rotation- 
or translation-invariant way.  Quantum mechanics and indeed common sense suggest that we cannot 
measure such exact values, but they do not imply that no exact values exist in the world.  If a quantum 
vacuum fluctuation does not in fact define any exact point in space and time, perhaps the exact center of 
some well defined lump in the Schrödinger wave function does.  We need not be able to measure an exact 
value in order to argue that it is, or could be, determined by an invariant distribution and therefore 
contradicts regularity.  Furthermore, if we must imagine another world in which such a distribution is 
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conceptually possible processes such as a fair lottery with infinitely many tickets, and a dart 
throw with a perfectly symmetric distribution seems at least as conceivable as a fair infinite 
lottery.15  So if we need a probability theory that makes sense of the infinite lottery, as Benci et 
al. claim, then we arguably need one that also accommodates invariant continuous distributions.  
But the circle argument shows that such a theory cannot be regular. 
 
2.4 The urn argument 
Benci et al. (2016) introduce their own symmetry argument against regularity, intending 
to refute it and thereby illustrate how the other ones go wrong.  Their argument is based on a 
fair infinite lottery, which is also the main motivating example for their Non-Archimedean 
Probability (NAP) theory (2011, 2016; cf. Wenmackers 2011, Wenmackers and Horsten 2013).  
Their argument runs as follows: 
 Imagine an urn containing a countably infinite collection of tickets and a 
mechanism to implement a fair lottery on the tickets in the urn.   
 In situation (1), all tickets are in the urn and we denote the probability of 
winning of each arbitrary single ticket in such a lottery as Prob(E1), leaving open the 
possibility that this may be an infinitesimal. 
 In situation (2), one ticket is removed from the urn prior to the drawing of the 
winning ticket.  There is one competing ticket less, so the probability of winning of each 
remaining ticket is Prob(E2) = 
11− Probሺ𝐸1ሻ Prob(E1) (renormalization).  Taken in isolation, 
however, situation (2) looks exactly as before the removal of a ticket, which is situation 
(1).  Because of this isomorphism between situation (1) and situation (2), we find that 
the probability of winning of each individual ticket is equal to Prob(E2) = Prob(E1). … 
Even in a non-Archimedean [hyperreal] field, these equalities can only hold 
simultaneously if Prob(E1) = Prob(E2) = 0.  (Benci et al. 2016) 
 
Thus, according to this argument, E1 and E2 are possible but have probability zero, so again 
regularity fails. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
possible, we do not need any further intuition about the physics of the process in order to conclude that it 
would violate regularity. 
15 It is not obvious that a fair infinite lottery really is conceptually coherent, but Benci et al. take it to be 
so. 
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The  relevant ǲisomorphismǳ here is expressed in the stipulation that the new situation 
(2) ǲlooks exactly as beforeǳ.  The qualitative physical circumstances are the same, or at least, 
the argument assumes that they are sufficiently alike that the probability of choosing a given 
ticket should be the same in situations (1) and (2).  If we like, we can further stipulate that the 
remaining tickets in situation (2) shift so that they have exactly the same states as those in 
situation (1).  Then, as in the coin argument, IP implies that the probabilities are the same.    
 
2.5 A problem with the urn argument 
Below we will turn to Benci et al.ǯs attempt to refute this argument, but let us note here a 
problem with it that they do not discuss.  The renormalization step, according to which Prob(E2) 
= 
11− Probሺ𝐸1ሻ Prob(E1), is not obviously correct.  It assumes that removing a ticket increases the 
probability of being selected for each remaining ticket, but this need not be so.  Removing a 
ticket changes the physical situation, at least in terms of bare identities, and for the regularist 
there is no general rule that says this will change the probability for any of the remaining 
tickets.  Regularity does imply that removing a ticket increases the probability that the chosen 
ticket will lie in the set of all other tickets,16 but that does not imply that the probability has 
changed for any particular ticket.  It may be tempting to object, ǲHow can the probability 
increase for the set of remaining tickets if it does not increase for any individual ticket?ǳ, but 
that objection presupposes countable additivity, or something like it, and proponents of 
infinitesimal probabilities are already willing to sacrifice countable additivity (e.g., Benci et al. 
2013; 2016).   
One might think that the renormalization step is justified by conditionalization, as Benci 
et al. later seem to suggest (p. 19).  Let Ct be the event that a ticket t is chosen in situation (1).  
                                                     
16 Let T be the set of tickets and t the ticket removed.  In situation (1), the probability that a ticket in T \ 
{t} is selected is 1 – Prob(E1).  Assuming regularity and that range(Prob) is contained in an ordered field, 
1 – Prob(E1) < 1.  In situation (2), the probability that a ticket in T \ {t} is selected is one, which is larger. 
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Since the lottery is fair, Prob(Ct) = Prob(Cu) = Prob(E1) for any two tickets t and u.  Now suppose 
that ticket t is the one removed in situation (2).  If we therefore assume that Prob(E2) is equal to 
the conditional probability Prob(Cu | ~Ct), the ratio formula for conditional probability gives us  
Prob(E2) = 
Probሺ𝐶ೠ & ~𝐶೟ሻProbሺ~𝐶೟ሻ  = Probሺ𝐶ೠሻ1− Probሺ𝐶೟ሻ = 11− Probሺ𝐸1ሻ Prob(E1),   
which is precisely the renormalization step.  But this assumption that Prob(E2) = Prob(Cu | ~Ct) 
is not obviously correct either.  Conditional probability is commonly used to model situations 
where we have obtained some information about an outcome, such as the news that ticket t was 
not chosen.  It also models cases where we adopt a policy, e.g., if ticket t is chosen, put it back 
and repeat the experiment.  But Benci et al.ǯs case is neither of those.  It is a case where a ticket 
has been physically removed, and there is no general rule about how that will affect the 
probabilities for the remaining tickets.  So this application of conditional probability is 
unjustified. 
Thus, the argument that regularity contradicts IP in this case is incomplete.  However, 
there could conceivably be situations, perhaps specific selection mechanisms, for which the 
renormalization step or some similar move17 is correct.  As with the circle argument, such a 
situation is at least as conceivable as the fair infinite lottery itself.  But regardless of whether the 
urn argument can be salvaged, we will see that Benci et al.ǯs way of countering it, as with the 
other arguments, is unsuccessful. 
 
3. Objections and replies 
3.1 Howson’s objection to Williamson 
                                                     
17 Benci et al.ǯs renormalization step implies that the probabilities for all remaining tickets are affected 
equally, i.e., multiplied by the same factor, but that is not needed.  All that is needed to complete the urn 
argument is a case where removing a ticket multiplies the probability for some particular ticket by a 
factor other than one. 
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Howson claims that Williamsonǯs argument fails due to ǲa confusion about what he calls Ǯisomorphic eventsǯ, assisted by an inadequate notation.ǳ  The key point in Howsonǯs argument 
is that, in an appropriate probability model for Williamsonǯs example, Hȋͳ…Ȍ is a singleton set, 
containing just one element of the sample space, while Hȋʹ…Ȍ is a pair, containing two elements 
of the sample space.  Since a singleton is not isomorphic to a pair, the events are not isomorphic 
and the argument fails.  Howson goes on to consider variations on Williamsonǯs argument, but 
this is the main thrust of his objection. 
To be precise, Howson specifies a probability space 2N, F, P , where the sample space 2N  
is the set of all countable, one-way infinite sequences of zeros and ones, such as 0, 1, 1, 0,… ; F 
is the algebra generated by the cylinder sets18 of 2N; and P is a hyperreal-valued probability 
function defined on F.  Williamsonǯs event Hȋͳ…Ȍ is then modelled as the set { ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… } and 
Hȋʹ…Ȍ as the set { ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… , Ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,…  }.  Note that the elements of an ǲeventǳ in probability 
theory represent disjunctive alternatives.  The sets { ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… , Ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,…  }, for example, 
correspond to the disjunction ([H(1) & H(2) & H(3) &…] or [TȋͳȌ & HȋʹȌ & Hȋ͵Ȍ & …]Ȍ, where 
T(1) is the event that the first outcome is tails.  
In general, two collections are said to be isomorphic if there is a bijection between them 
that preserves all relevant structure.  In algebra, for example, an isomorphism preserves the 
algebraic relations between elements.  But the sets { ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… } and { ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,…  , Ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,…  } are 
not isomorphic in any sense, because there is not even a bijection between them.  Thus, 
according to Howson, Williamsonǯs events are not isomorphic, so his argument is a non-starter. 
 
3.2 Reply 
                                                     
18 The assumption that F is an algebra generated by cylinder sets is unnecessary here.  If we are willing to 
relinquish the possibility of translation invariance, as regularists must, we can define P on the entire 
power set of 2N.  But the particular domain of P does not bear on Howsonǯs objection so long as it includes 
{ ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… } and { ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,…  , Ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,…  }. 
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What Williamson means by ǲisomorphic eventsǳ does not concern ǲeventsǳ in the jargon 
of probability theory, i.e., sets in the algebra of a probability space, but physical events, in the 
ordinary sense of things that happen, or things that might happen.  As we saw, Williamson is 
concerned with ǲthe physical structure of the set-upǳ and the ǲqualitative typeǳ of events.  
Moreover, he explains what he means by Ǯisomorphic eventsǯ in terms of a structure-preserving 
map, not between subsets of the sample space, but between ǲthe constituent single-toss eventsǳ HȋͳȌ, HȋʹȌ, Hȋ͵Ȍ,… and HȋʹȌ, Hȋ͵Ȍ, HȋͶȌ,… that make up the events Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ, 
respectively.  While Howsonǯs ǲeventsǳ are effectively sets of disjuncts, Williamsonǯs ǲisomorphismǳ consists in a mapping between the conjunct events in Hȋͳ…Ȍ = HȋͳȌ & HȋʹȌ & Hȋ͵Ȍ &… and Hȋʹ…Ȍ = HȋʹȌ & Hȋ͵Ȍ & HȋͶȌ &….  (I do not mean a mapping between the symbols 
that serve as conjuncts in a sentence, but between the physical events that form a larger event.) 
Furthermore, Williamsonǯs set-up guarantees a mapping of the conjunct events that preserves 
qualitative physical properties and relations.  He specifically stipulates that the coin tosses in 
his sequences use the same fair coin and that the time intervals between tosses are the same.  
We could go further and stipulate that all qualitative properties of the tosses and sequences of 
tosses are exactly the same.  Then the events Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ, construed not as subsets of a 
sample space but as physical things that might happen, are indeed isomorphic in Williamsonǯs 
intended sense.  On his view, P({ ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… }) should equal P({ ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,…  , Ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,…  }), not 
because these two sets are isomorphic (which they clearly are not), but because the physical 
events they model are qualitatively alike.19 
                                                     
19 An anonymous reviewer objects that Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ are not qualitatively identical because Hȋʹ…Ȍ accommodates the possibility of a tail at the first flip and Hȋͳ…Ȍ does not.  But as Williamson understands 
these events, neither accommodates a tail at ǲthe first flipǳ.  Let us label the flips of Hȋͳ…Ȍ flip ͳ, flip ʹ, etc.  Then on Williamsonǯs conception, the ǲfirst flipǳ of Hȋʹ…Ȍ is flip ʹ, which must come up heads if Hȋʹ…Ȍ occurs.  The reviewerǯs objection seems to require that Hȋʹ…Ȍ somehow incorporate the outcome of flip ͳ, 
even though flip 1 is logically and probabilistically independent of the occurrence or non-occurrence of Hȋʹ…Ȍ.  I think that Williamson, on the other hand, thinks of Hȋʹ…Ȍ as consisting in certain intrinsic 
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Furthermore, there is an argument available that such isomorphism ought to imply 
equal probability, namely the argument above from (I) and (II), and this argument appeals only 
to the physical character of the events-in-the-ordinary-sense, not to the set-theoretic structure 
of the sets that represent those events in a particular mathematical model.  Whatever model we 
might adopt, the physical argument still holds sway, so far as its premises are plausible.  So 
Howsonǯs set-theoretic objection misses the mark by a wide margin. 
To be fair, Williamsonǯs use of Ǯisomorphismǯ to express physical similarity shoulders 
some blame for this misunderstanding.  An isomorphism is normally a mapping between sets, 
not between physical things-that-could-happen.  Nonetheless, the intended principle is clear:  If 
the same experiment is conducted under the same conditions at two different times, the 
probabilities of the outcomes should be the same.  Howson seems to have ignored this point in 
order to raise a technical issue that, in the end, is not relevant. 
 
3.3 Events as sentences 
Just as Williamsonǯs ǲisomorphic eventsǳ are not sets, they are not sentences either.20  
They are physical things-that-might-happen.  Thus, as noted above, when we speak of a mapping between the conjuncts that constitute Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ, this is not a mapping 
between the symbolic conjuncts in a sentence, but between the physical coin flip events that make up Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ.  Otherwise, one might be tempted to object that Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ 
                                                                                                                                                                     
structural properties of the physical motion of a coin beginning at time t0 + 1, and not concerning in any 
way events occurring before t0 + ͳ.  Thus, Hȋʹ…Ȍ does not at all concern flip ͳ, which occurs at time t0.  Likewise Hȋͳ…Ȍ, for Williamson, concerns the intrinsic structural properties of the motion of a coin from 
time t0 onward, and nothing else.  Williamsonǯs isomorphism claim is just the claim that these structural properties, those of the coinǯs motion from t0 onwards in Hȋͳ…Ȍ and those of its motion from t0 + 1 onwards in Hȋʹ…Ȍ, are qualitatively identical, and this is just true by stipulation. 
20 This interpretation was suggested by an anonymous reviewer. 
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cannot be isomorphic because the first is just the infinite sentence ǮHȋͳȌ & HȋʹȌ & Hȋ͵Ȍ & …ǯ 
while the second is an infinite sentence of the disjunctive form  
Hȋ2…ȌDis: ǮHȋͳȌ & HȋʹȌ & Hȋ͵Ȍ & … or TȋͳȌ & HȋʹȌ & Hȋ͵Ȍ & …ǯ.   
To do so would miss two important points.   
First, the fact that Hȋʹ…Ȍ can be viewed as a disjunction or disjunctive event does not imply that it must be so understood.  To say that Hȋʹ…Ȍ is really of the form Hȋʹ…ȌDis is like 
saying that the event of my winning the lottery today is really the event of my winning the 
lottery today and having tuna for lunch or winning the lottery today and not having tuna for 
lunch.  The tuna is a red herring.  It is irrelevant to my winning the lottery, just as the first coin flip in Hȋͳ…Ȍ is irrelevant to the probability of Hȋʹ…Ȍ.  Even if we were to understand Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ as sentences, there is no reason that Hȋʹ…Ȍ must take the form Hȋʹ…ȌDis, for, given 
Williamsonǯs specification of the experiments, Hȋʹ…ȌDis is logically equivalent to the simpler 
sentence ǮH(2) & H(3) & Hȋ͵Ȍ …ǯ, which is structurally identical to the natural expression ǮH(1) & HȋʹȌ & Hȋ͵Ȍ & …ǯ for Hȋͳ…Ȍ.   
But this brings us to the second point:  Williamson is not concerned with a mapping 
between linguistic objects, but between possible physical occurrences.  It is not a structural 
similarity between symbol strings that concerns him, but between physical events that might 
occur in the world.  If you like, these can be understood as mathematical structures that might 
be instantiated by the behaviour of physical coins.  They are not instantiated by letters on paper 
or words from a mouth.  Again, this is clear from Williamsonǯs deliberate specification of the 
physical conditions and his references to ǲphysical structureǳ and ǲqualitative typeǳ.  The 
important thing for Williamson is that, by stipulation, there is no intrinsic qualitative difference between the physical events Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ.  They differ in their times of occurrence, their 
relations to each other and other events, and their bare haecceities if you like, but those are 
precisely the kinds of things that, on the plausible principle IP, make no difference to their 
probabilities. 
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3.4 Howson, the circle, and the urn 
Howson 2017 is concerned only with the coin flip argument and a couple of variations on 
it, not with the circle argument or the urn.  However, it is worth noting that, while Howsonǯs 
critique of the coin flip argument misses the point, it does not apply at all to the other 
arguments.  In the circle argument, the physical event that the point chosen by the dart throw 
lies in C0 is represented by the set C0 itself, and likewise for C1.  Since C1 is just a rotation of C0, 
the two sets are set-theoretically, topologically, and metrically isomorphic.  But the circle 
argument does not rely on isomorphism per se.  It uses the fact that the two sets are rotations of 
each other, and assumes explicitly that the probability distribution is rotationally symmetric.  So 
Howsonǯs complaint about Williamsonǯs argument, that the sets representing the events are not 
isomorphic, is not true of the circle argument, nor relevant. 
Nor is there a parallel of Howsonǯs critique for the urn argument.  There the event of 
drawing a given ticket is naturally represented by a singleton {n}  N, in both situations (1) and 
(2).  Since any such singletons are isomorphic, the set-theoretic ǲeventsǳ in the models are 
indeed isomorphic and Howsonǯs objection does not apply.  Of course, the fact that two 
singletons are trivially isomorphic is no reason that they should be assigned the same 
probability, but the urn argument does not rely on such an isomorphism between subsets of the 
sample space.  Like the coin flip argument, it turns instead on a qualitative similarity between 
physical situations.  So here too, an objection along Howsonǯs line is both false and irrelevant. 
 
3.5 Benci et al.’s objection to the urn argument 
Benci et al. point out that we can model the urn experiments in different ways, and while 
we can equate the probability of E1 under one model with that of E2 under another, we should 
not normally compare the probabilities given by two different models or interpretations.  ǲ[C]hanging the sample space mid-game," as they put it, ǲis, in general, not allowed.ǳ   
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Specifically, they suggest that we model situation (1) with the sample space N and a 
hyperreal-valued function P on the subsets of N such that P({n}) = 1/α for each n  N, where α is 
the size of N in a non-standard measure (ǲnumerosityǳ).21  Benci et al. call this model A and 
write ProbA(E1) for the probability that a given ticket is selected in situation (1) under model 
A.22  According to them, we can represent situation (2) in the same model using conditional 
probability:  The probability of selecting ticket number n given that some other ticket i has been 
removed is given, they claim, by  
ProbA(E2) = P({n}|N\{i}) = 1/(α – 1) > 1/α = ProbA(E1).23   
So, on model A, the probability that a given ticket is chosen varies from situation (1) to (2). 
On the other hand, they point out, we can also represent situation (2) by letting N 
represent the remaining tickets, after ticket i has been removed.  In that case, a natural model B 
gives the probability ProbB(E2) = 1/α of choosing one of the remaining tickets in situation (2).  
Thus, ProbA(E1) is equal to ProbB(E2), but, according to Benci et al., A and B are two different 
models, and the fact that two events have the same probability under two different models does 
not imply that they must have the same probability in a single model.   
                                                     
21 Benci and others (e.g., Benci 1995; Benci and Di Nasso 2003; Di Nasso and Forti 2010; Benci, Bottazzi 
and Di Nasso 2014)  have developed an alternative theory of set size called numerosity theory, where the 
size of an infinite set is not a Cantorian cardinal number but a hyper-integer.  From this, one can derive a 
fair NAP distribution by assigning to each element of a sample space the hyperreal probability equal to 
the reciprocal of the numerosity of the sample space.  
22 Remember, ProbA is not identical to P.  ProbA applies to physical events, while P applies to subsets of N.  
If we let lA be a ǲlabellingǳ that maps physical events to sets in N, then ProbA can be understood as the 
composition P  lA, i.e., ProbA(E) = P(lA(E)).  
23 As noted above, this is not obviously correct, since in situation (2) we are not merely conditionalizing 
but considering an altered setup, and we cannot assume countable additivity here. 
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Let us clarify something here:  Technically, A and B are not different models.  They are two 
names for the same mathematical model, with the same sample space N and the same 
assignments of values to subsets of N (or at least, Benci et al. do not indicate any difference 
between the assignments).  However, this model is associated with two different interpretations 
or ǲlabellingsǳ, different ways of associating physical events with sets in the model.  For ǲmodel 
Aǳ, each natural number corresponds to one of the original tickets, while for ǲmodel Bǳ, each 
natural number corresponds to one of the remaining tickets, after one has been removed.  So the 
real difference is not between two models but between two labellings.  However, Benci et al.ǯs 
point is no less valid; the fact that two events have the same probability under different 
labellings does not imply that they must have the same probability under a single labelling.   
Thus, according to Benci et al., the urn argument commits an oversight.  We thought we 
had shown simply that Prob(E1) = Prob(E2), when actually we had only shown that ProbA(E1) = 
ProbB(E2), for two different labellings A and B, and this does not support the conclusion that 
regularity fails.  
 
3.6 Reply 
Benci et al. are quite right:  The fact that two events have the same probability under two 
different labellings does not imply that they simply have the same probability.  However, there 
is a further reason to think that, under any accurate model, the probability of drawing a given 
ticket in situations (1) and (2) should be the same.  The reason is that the qualitative physical 
situation is exactly the same in both cases, and by our principle IP, the same event under the 
same qualitative circumstances should have the same probability.  Benci et al. even make such 
an argument themselves when they write that ǲsituation (2) looks exactly as before the removal 
of a ticket,….  Because of this isomorphism between situation (1) and situation (2), we find that 
the probability of winning of each individual ticket is equalǳ (2016, my emphasis).  Yet, when 
they come to their reply, they ignore the premise that ǲisomorphicǳ events should have the 
same probability and claim instead that the argument trades on a conflation of two different 
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labellings.  In fact, their own presentation of the argument involves no such conflation; it is 
clearly founded on IP, and as noted, there is an argument for IP from more basic principles.  
Given IP, any model in which the probability of drawing a given ticket (other than the one 
removed) varies from situation (1) to situation (2) is an inaccurate model.  Benci et al. have 
tried to show that one can construct such a model, where ProbA(E2) > ProbA(E1), but that does 
nothing to refute the argument from IP that any such model is inaccurate. 
 
3.7 Benci et al.’s objection to the coin flip argument  
Following the same line as their objection to the urn argument, Benci et al. claim that 
Williamson conflates two different probability models for his coin flip experiments.  They again 
refer to ǲtwo modelsǳ A and B, which are actually the same model with two different labellings.  
In model A, they say, the sample space (or more accurately the labelling) ǲreflects that the count of events starts at the first toss of Hȋͳ…Ȍǳ, while in model B the same sample space (with a 
different labelling) is used ǲto reflect that the count of events starts at the first toss of Hȋʹ…Ȍ.ǳ  
Let us make this more explicit.  Define labellings lA and lB so that    
lA(Hȋͳ…ȌȌ = { ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… }, 
lA(Hȋʹ…ȌȌ = { Ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… ,  ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… },
lB(Hȋʹ…ȌȌ = { ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… }.  
Thus, under lA, Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ are represented by the same sets as in Howsonǯs objection, 
while under lB, Hȋʹ…Ȍ is represented by { ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… } and Hȋͳ…Ȍ has no representation at all.  
Now let P: 2N  [0, 1]* where [0, 1]* is a hyperreal unit interval, and for any physical event in 
the domain of lX, for X = A, B, let ProbX(E) = P(lX(E)).  Hence,  
ProbAȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ = P(lAȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ = P({ ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… }),  
ProbAȋHȋʹ…ȌȌ = P({ Ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… , ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… }), and  
ProbBȋHȋʹ…ȌȌ = P({ ͳ, ͳ, ͳ,… }) = ProbAȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ.   
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Now Benci et al. write, 
Williamson exploits the intuition that ProbA(H(1…)) = ProbB(H(ʹ…)).  But he glosses 
this as Prob(Hȋͳ…ȌȌ = Prob(H(2…ȌȌ, thus turning the probabilities involved into 
evaluations within the same model.  On the other hand, Williamson convincingly argues that ProbȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ = ½ ProbȋHȋʹ…ȌȌ. … The two glosses indeed contradict each other unless ProbȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ = ProbȋHȋʹ…ȌȌ = Ͳ.  But the contradiction can only be 
obtained when the difference between the sample spaces is glossed over.  (2016, 22) 
 
In other words, Williamsonǯs claim that Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ should have the same probability is 
founded on a conflation of ProbA and ProbB. 
 
3.8 Reply 
There is no textual evidence that Williamson conflates two different models or labellings.  
In fact, there is clear evidence to the contrary:  Williamson tells us why Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ should 
have the same probability.  It is because they are (physically) isomorphic.  That argument does 
not depend on the particular model or labelling employed.  Williamsonǯs point is that, in any 
accurate model of his proposed experiment, Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ will have the same probability.  
Thus he would insist, not that ProbAȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ = ProbBȋHȋʹ…ȌȌ, but that ProbAȋHȋͳ…ȌȌ should 
equal ProbAȋHȋʹ…ȌȌ, or else A is just not a good model.  There is no reason to suppose that this is 
founded on any slide or conflation.  It is clearly founded on the principle that physically 
isomorphic events should have the same probability, and again, there is a simple argument 
available for that principle.  Thus, contrary to Benci et al.ǯs claim in the above passage, the 
contradiction can indeed be obtained in a single model, with a single sample space, if one only 
takes seriously Williamsonǯs premise that physically isomorphic events have the same 
probability. 
Later (p. 38), Benci et al. acknowledge the physical basis of Williamsonǯs argument, 
writing, ǲWe know, one might say, that the laws of physics are time-translation invariant.ǳ  Yet 
they then complain that ǲit is still not easy to see why the NAP treatment of Williamsonǯs 
scenario has to violate time-translation invariance.ǳ  Well, the reasons are straightforward: 
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1. Any regular probability model that assigns probabilities to Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ must assign a larger probability to Hȋʹ…Ȍ.   
2. Hȋʹ…Ȍ is a time translation of Hȋͳ….Ȍ.24 
3. Therefore, any regular probability model for Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ violates time 
translation invariance. 
4. All NAP models are regular. 
5. Therefore, any NAP model for Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ violates time translation invariance.  
QED. 
It is also true that, given a NAP model that assigns a probability to Hȋͳ…Ȍ, one could consider a 
different NAP model that assigns the same probability to Hȋʹ…), but that is irrelevant.  The first 
model on its own must violate time invariance because it assigns a larger probability to Hȋʹ…Ȍ than Hȋͳ…Ȍ, and the second model must also violate time invariance because it assigns a larger probability to Hȋ͵…Ȍ (the event that each flip after the second comes up heads) than to Hȋʹ…Ȍ.  
Moreover, if we want to understand the relation between the probabilities of Hȋͳ…Ȍ and Hȋʹ…Ȍ, 
we need to represent them together in one model.  If that model is regular, it cannot be time 
invariant. 
 
3.9 Benci et al.’s objection to the circle argument 
Benci et al. rehearse a version of the circle example, referring to Parker 2013 and others.25  
They then remark, ǲIt will be clear to the reader by now that our diagnosis of the argument from 
                                                     
24 An anonymous reviewer objects that Hȋʹ…Ȍ is not a time translation of Hȋͳ…Ȍ because the former 
accommodates the possibility of a tail at the first flip and the latter does not.  But as argued in note 18, 
H(2..) can be understood, as Williamson seems to understand it, as a physical event that occurs entirely after the first flip of Hȋͳ…Ȍ and does not involve that first flip at all. 
25 The example in Parker 2013 is suggestive but does not concern probability.  Rather it is used to argue that ǲEuclideanǳ theories of cardinality such as numerosity (see note 20) also violate rotation and 
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rotational symmetry against infinitesimal probabilities is structurally identical to our diagnosis 
of Williamsonǯs argument.  Hence, we do not describe it in detail here.ǳ 
So let us describe it in detail.  The diagnosis of Williamsonǯs argument was that he 
conflates two different probability models, or more precisely, two different labellings.  
Presumably, then, Benci et al. would claim that the circle argument tacitly appeals to two 
different labellings lA and lB, such that ProbA(C0) = P(lA(C0)) = P(lB(C1)) = ProbB(C1).  Then they 
will say (if the diagnosis is indeed structurally identical to that of Williamsonǯs argument) that 
the circle argument tacitly switches labellings mid-game, and if we do not conflate ProbA with 
ProbB, there is no reason to suppose that ProbX(C0) = ProbX(C1) on any one labelling lX.  
 
3.10 Reply 
In reality, the circle argument stated here explicitly assumes that there is a single finitely 
additive (and possibly hyperreal) probability function P that assigns values to both C0 and C1 
and which is rotationally symmetric.26  It follows trivially that P(C0) = P(C1), because C1 is a 
rotation of C0.  And, as noted, the event EC that the point determined by a dart throw lies in a set 
C is represented by that very set C.  So there is only one labelling in play, namely l(EC) = C for 
each subset C of the circle.  The argument involves no conflation of models or labellings.  It only 
assumes that the distribution is rotationally symmetric, and hence, that a rotationally 
symmetric continuous distribution is possible.  In the dart throwing implementation, this 
amounts to assuming that it is possible to throw a dart, or construct a device to throw a dart, in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
translation invariance, and consequently lack certain theoretical virtues.  Parker 2012 gives the parallel 
argument against regular probabilities. 
26 Parker 2012 argues contrapositively from the assumption of regularity to the failure of rotation 
invariance, but again it is explicitly a failure of rotation invariance for a single probability function.  
Bernstein and Wattenberg 1969, Barrett 2010, and Pruss 2013 also discuss invariance for a single 
probability function.  Of course, Benci et al. could claim that these are all careless glosses, but there is no 
need for such accusations if the arguments are taken at face value. 
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such a way as to yield a rotationally symmetric distribution.  A dedicated regularist would have 
to deny that such a strictly symmetric distribution is possible.  But that is a strong claim to make 
on the back of intuition, conceptual analysis, or theoretical virtues.  It is at least conceptually 
possible that some perfectly symmetric set-up could produce a perfectly symmetric 
distribution.  Benci et al. do not deny this; they only hint that the argument involves a conflation 
of two different models, and that is simply not the case. 
 
4. Next moves 
If, as I have argued, Howson and Benci et al.ǯs replies fail to refute these three arguments, 
what more could they say in defense of regular and hyperreal probabilities? 
Howson might respond by pointing to a merely instrumental role for hyperreal 
probabilities.  He writes, 
[T]he object there is not so much, or at all, to regard hyperreal probabilities as on the 
same footing as real-valued ones but to use the nonstandard universe simply as an aid to 
the standard theory by translating standard problems into nonstandard ones by means of the Transfer Principle, where they are often more tractable…. (2016) 
 
Consequently, he might say, proponents of hyperreal probabilities will not be troubled by 
arguments from physical principles.  However, this is not how philosophers typically use 
hyperreal probabilities.  Hofweber (2014), defends hyperreal probabilities on conceptual 
grounds.  His Minimal Constraint on probability measures is 
(MC) If the chance of p is 0, then not p. If the chance of p is 1, then p.  
ǲI canǯt help but to judge,ǳ he writes, ǲthat (MC) is a conceptual truth about chance, given that 0 is the lowest and ͳ the highest possible measure of chance. … It is a conceptual truth about 
chance that an event which happens has a better chance of happening than an event which is 
conceptually incoherent.ǳ  Lewis expresses a similar sentiment:  ǲZero chance is no chance, and 
nothing with zero chance ever happensǳ (1983, 176).  Lewis and Hofweber do not use 
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infinitesimals to facilitate calculations, they just think that infinitesimals correctly represent the 
structure of chances in the real world (whether as a merely conceptual truth or a more realist 
metaphysical claim).  Benci et al., on the other hand, champion infinitesimal probabilities in 
order to make better sense of what they consider to be conceptually possible scenarios, such as 
infinite lotteries.  NAP models, they argue, have theoretical virtues over the de Finetti (1974) 
approach to infinite lotteries (which is essentially just to drop countable additivity) and even 
over the standard treatment of continuous sample spaces.  To an extent, the possibility of 
calculation is one of their concerns, for it is one of the stated motivations for their generalized 
continuity axiom.  But their primary motivation is not to simplify calculations.  It is to find 
enlightening models, models that can give us a better theoretical handle on problematic 
hypothetical processes.  So Howsonǯs instrumentalist view of hyperreal probabilities is not in 
line with the philosophical literature.27 
Still, Benci et al. seem inclined to a milder pragmatism.  Some of their discussion suggests 
a general antirealism about probability models.  ǲ[T]here is no reason to assume,ǳ they write, ǲthat there is a unique best way to model certain infinite probabilistic situations…ǳ  Thus they 
might counter the arguments against regularity by claiming that, even if the space-time 
invariance of probabilities is sometimes mandated by plausible or useful principles, the best 
models over all might involve an infinitesimal deviation from such invariance.  Or they might 
just argue that it is useful to apply various models to a given process, if only to better 
understand the space of possible models and their virtues and limitations. 
Yet, as Benci et al. themselves point out, it could be argued that, ǲThere is such a thing as 
physical chance.  And it is a legitimate task of our mathematical models to track this property.ǳ  
Plausibly, the chances for a given experiment have a definite structure.  The outcomes in any 
sequence of die rolls or coin flips exhibit a distinctive and robust pattern, largely independent of 
the detailed circumstances or the observerǯs conceptions.  It is one of the main goals of 
                                                     
27 Bartha and Hitchcock (1999) is an explicitly instrumentalist exception. 
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probability theory to accurately characterize and explain such patterns.  Benci et al. respond to 
such a realist viewpoint as follows:  
But our models can only track physical chance in a mediated way.  In order to describe 
a physical system and its behaviour, our probabilistic models have to select a sample 
space and label the point events (that is, establish a connection between reality and 
point events in the model).  For finite sample spaces, the labelling does not matter; but 
for infinite sample spaces, different labellings can result in different probability 
assignments.  All this induces a degree of relativity in probability values of events.  
(2016, 34)  
 
Thus, according to Benci et al., any probability model with an infinite sample space will involve 
some arbitrariness, whether it is a standard Kolmogorovian model or a regular one.  Their main 
concern in this passage is arbitrariness related to the choice of labelling and, for NAP models, 
the choice of an ultrafilter, but it suggests they might take a similarly noncommittal stance 
toward the choice between regular and space-time invariant models.   
The problem with such a stance is that it appears incompatible with the goal of accurately 
modelling physical chances.  For the kinds of experiments discussed here, a model cannot be 
both regular and space-time invariant.  If our goal is to characterize the true structure of the 
chances in such experiments, we should take into account whether the chances are truly space-
time invariant or regular (or neither).  This leaves us little freedom to choose; either regular 
models are accurate or they are not, and the examples discussed here give us some reason to 
believe that, at least in those cases, they are not. 
This brings us to another possible position, namely that of a moderate, pluralistic 
regularist who holds that, in cases where there is a strong argument from IP against regularity, 
the latter might fail, but otherwise it should hold.  However, this position is awkward, especially 
for Benci et al.  Their main application of NAP is to the de Finetti lottery with an infinite number 
of tickets, but their own urn argument suggests that such a lottery can bring regularity into 
conflict with IP or other plausible symmetry assumptions (provided there are cases where 
something like their renormalization step applies).  To hold this pluralistic regularist position 
would mean holding that infinite lotteries are not regular when the specific conditions that 
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justify such a renormalization step hold, but they are generally regular otherwise.  If we admit 
that regularity is false for certain selection mechanisms, why should we expect it to hold for 
others? 
We can make this point more concrete.  Suppose we have a lottery machine for which the 
renormalization step is valid, and suppose the moderate regularist admits that regularity fails 
for this lottery machine.  Now let us add to this machine a component that detects which tickets 
are present in the urn.  If one of the original tickets is removed, it applies a different selection 
mechanism for which no such renormalization formula applies.  For this composite lottery 
machine, we cannot make Benci et al.ǯs urn argument.  Will the moderate regularist then claim 
that regularity does hold for the composite machine?  Surely, if the composite machine applies 
the same mechanism as the original machine when all the original tickets are present, then in 
that case it produces the same distribution as the original machine.  Thus, such opportunistic 
regularism is generally untenable.  Similarly, if we accept that there are realizations of the circle 
example where the distribution is fully rotation-symmetric and regularity fails, we should not 
expect that regularity holds whenever the distribution is not perfectly symmetric. 
What this illustrates is that, if indeed we are concerned with accurately modelling the 
structure of objective chances, then the question of regularity turns not on theoretical virtues, 
but on the details of the probabilistic processes under study.  If indeed there are cases where 
regularity does not hold, then (1) there is no sound and fully general argument for regularity, 
and (2) regularity is not needed to render such experiments conceptually coherent.  At most, 
regular models boast certain theoretical virtues while lacking others, namely those of 
permitting invariance under various transformations.  But if there are any facts about the 
structure of chances, the model should reflect those facts first, and desirable theoretical virtues 
only as accuracy permits.  Of course, it may be difficult to determine what the most accurate 
model is in any particular case, but if we have good reason to believe that chances are not 
regular in certain cases, we can reasonably hypothesize that they are not regular in similar 
cases either. 
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5. Conclusion 
We have reviewed three arguments that certain hypothetical experiments exhibit non-
regular probabilities.  If these arguments succeed, then regularity does not generally hold, and 
there is little reason to believe that it typically holds for other experiments, nor that we should 
demand it in our credences.  Howson and Benci et al. have attempted to refute those arguments, 
but their refutations fail.  Howson points out that Williamsonǯs events are not in fact isomorphic, 
because one is a singleton while the other is a pair, but this misses the point.  Howson is 
speaking of the abstract ǲeventsǳ of mathematical probability theory, which are sets, while 
Williamson is concerned with events in the ordinary sense of things that could happen.  When 
Williamson says that his two coin flip sequences are isomorphic, he does not mean that they are 
subsets of a sample space that have a one-to-one correspondence, he means that they have all of 
the same physical qualitative properties, and this is true by hypothesis.  Benci et al. claim that 
Williamson, Parker, and they themselves found their arguments on a conflation of different 
probability models.  The symmetries between Williamsonǯs coin flip sequences imply that they 
can be assigned the same probability in different models, but not that they must have the same 
probability in a single model, and likewise for Parkerǯs point sets and their own lottery draws.  
But none of these arguments is in fact based on such a conflation of models.  Williamsonǯs and 
Benci et al.ǯs are both founded on the principle that qualitatively identical events in qualitatively 
identical circumstances should have the same probability, and Parkerǯs is based on the 
plausibility of a perfectly symmetric continuous distribution.  All claim, not that their parallel 
events can be given the same probability in different models, but that the parallel events will 
have the same probability in any one model, if that model is accurate.  This is no mere slide. 
The principle underlying the circle and urn arguments, that ǲisomorphicǳ events have the 
same probability, is not above dispute, but we have provided here a simple argument from more 
fundamental hypotheses.  If (I) the laws of nature are space-time invariant, and (II) chances are 
determined by local qualitative circumstances and natural laws, it follows that qualitatively 
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identical events have the same chance, and should also be assigned the same credence insofar as 
rational credences track chance.  One who insists on regularity must therefore deny either the 
space-time invariance of laws or the grounding of chance in laws and qualitative circumstances. 
This leaves the regularist several options, including at least the following:  One may take a 
more or less instrumentalist view that is more concerned with the theoretical virtues of regular 
probabilities than with accurately modelling chances.  One may hold that regularity fails in the 
cases discussed but is still plausible in other cases, though we have seen that this is an 
uncomfortable position to hold.  Or, one might simply deny IP, as well as the very possibility of a 
symmetric continuous distribution.  Hofweber (2014), at least, prefers the latter move, and 
denies premise (II), that chances are determined by laws and local circumstances.  But if 
regularity requires that so-called objective chance is in reality such a contextual matter, or that 
the laws of physics are not in fact space-time invariant, then the arguments for regularity should 
be regarded very sceptically.  
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